Desde julho estou dando uma pausa ao blog para me dedicar aos estudos de cooperação internacional ao desenvolvimento. Durante este período, apesar da extrema restrição de tempo, não deixei de acompanhar os assuntos mais importantes no "mundo das drogas". Nem a mudança do diretor do UNODC, nem a derrota da propositon 19 na Califórnia, nem as discussões sobre maconha medicinal no Brasil me motivaram a voltar a escrever sobre o assunto. Por que então "a crise no Rio"?

Dentre todos os assuntos sobre os quais já estudei, debati, critiquei, realmente são somente dois que me movem profundamente. Um é a questão dos direitos dos usuários, principalmente no que diz respeito às decisões sobre tratar, não-tratar e como tratar e o outro e a violência ligada ao comércio de drogas, principalmente no Brasil. Assim resolvi "re-inaugurar" o meu blog com a reprodução deste artigo do blog de Luiz Eduardo Soares, que embora seja mais conhecido do grande público por seus livros que inspiraram os filmes Tropa de Elite, é um grande estudioso da violência urbana e da dinâmica polícia-estado na segurança pública fluminense. Ele critica aqui a hipocrisia da mídia e analisa o problema pontuando a necessidade de uma reforma profunda das polícias e das políticas de segurança pública no Rio.

quinta-feira, 25 de novembro de 2010 blog de Luiz Eduardo Soares

A crise no Rio e o pastiche midiático

Sempre mantive com jornalistas uma relação de respeito e cooperação. Em alguns casos, o contato profissional evoluiu para amizade. Quando as divergências são muitas e profundas, procuro compreender e buscar bases de um consenso mínimo, para que o diálogo não se inviabilize. Faço-o por ética –supondo que ninguém seja dono da verdade, muito menos eu--, na esperança de que o mesmo procedimento seja adotado pelo interlocutor. Além disso, me esforço por atender aos que me procuram, porque sei que atuam sob pressão, exaustivamente, premidos pelo tempo e por pautas urgentes. A pressa se intensifica nas crises, por motivos óbvios. Costumo dizer que só nós, da segurança pública (em meu caso, quando ocupava posições na área da gestão pública da segurança), os médicos e o pessoal da Defesa Civil, trabalhamos tanto –ou sob tanta pressão-- quanto os jornalistas.

Digo isso para explicar por que, na crise atual, tenho recusado convites para falar e colaborar com a mídia:

(1) Recebi muitos telefonemas, recados e mensagens. As chamadas são contínuas, a tal ponto que não me restou alternativa a desligar o celular. Ao todo, nesses dias, foram mais de cem pedidos de entrevistas ou declarações. Nem que eu contasse com uma equipe de secretários, teria como responder a todos e muito menos como atendê-los. Por isso, aproveito a oportunidade para desculpar-me. Creiam, não se trata de descortesia ou desapreço pelos repórteres, produtores ou entrevistadores que me procuraram.

(2) Além disso, não tenho informações de bastidor que mereçam divulgação. Por outro lado, não faria sentido jogar pelo ralo a credibilidade que construí ao longo da vida. E isso poderia acontecer se eu aceitasse aparecer na TV, no rádio ou nos jornais, glosando os discursos oficiais que estão sendo difundidos, declamando platitudes, reproduzindo o senso comum pleno de preconceitos, ou divagando em torno de especulações. A situação é muito grave e não admite leviandades. Portanto, só faria sentido falar se fosse para contribuir de modo eficaz para o entendimento mais amplo e profundo da realidade que vivemos. Como fazê-lo em alguns parcos minutos, entrecortados por intervenções de locutores e debatedores? Como fazê-lo no contexto em que todo pensamento analítico é editado, truncado, espremido –em uma palavra, banido--, para que reinem, incontrastáveis, a exaltação passional das emergências, as imagens espetaculares, os dramas individuais e a retórica paradoxalmente triunfalista do discurso oficial?

(3) Por fim, não posso mais compactuar com o ciclo sempre repetido na mídia: atenção à segurança nas crises agudas e nenhum investimento reflexivo e informativo realmente denso e consistente, na entressafra, isto é, nos intervalos entre as crises. Na crise, as perguntas recorrentes são: (a) O que fazer, já, imediatamente, para sustar a explosão de violência? (b) O que a polícia deveria fazer para vencer, definitivamente, o tráfico de drogas? (c) Por que o governo não chama o Exército? (d) A imagem internacional do Rio foi maculada? (e) Conseguiremos realizar com êxito a Copa e as Olimpíadas?

Ao longo dos últimos 25 anos, pelo menos, me tornei “as aspas” que ajudaram a legitimar inúmeras reportagens. No tópico, “especialistas”, lá estava eu, tentando, com alguns colegas, furar o bloqueio à afirmação de uma perspectiva um pouquinho menos trivial e imediatista. Muitas dessas reportagens, por sua excelente qualidade, prescindiriam de minhas aspas –nesses casos, reduzi-me a recurso ocioso, mera formalidade das regras jornalísticas. Outras, nem com todas as aspas do mundo se sustentariam. Pois bem, acho que já fui ou proporcionei aspas o suficiente. Esse código jornalístico, com as exceções de praxe, não funciona, quando o tema tratado é complexo, pouco conhecido e, por sua natureza, rebelde ao modelo de explicação corrente. Modelo que não nasceu na mídia, mas que orienta as visões aí predominantes. Particularmente, não gostaria de continuar a ser cúmplice involuntário de sua contínua reprodução.
Eis por que as perguntas mencionadas são expressivas do pobre modelo explicativo corrente e por que devem ser consideradas obstáculos ao conhecimento e réplicas de hábitos mentais refratários às mudanças inadiáveis. Respondo sem a elegância que a presença de um entrevistador exigiria. Serei, por assim dizer, curto e grosso, aproveitando-me do expediente discursivo aqui adotado, em que sou eu mesmo o formulador das questões a desconstruir. Eis as respostas, na sequência das perguntas, que repito para facilitar a leitura:

(a) O que fazer, já, imediatamente, para sustar a violência e resolver o desafio da insegurança?

Nada que se possa fazer já, imediatamente, resolverá a insegurança. Quando se está na crise, usam-se os instrumentos disponíveis e os procedimentos conhecidos para conter os sintomas e salvar o paciente. Se desejamos, de fato, resolver algum problema grave, não é possível continuar a tratar o paciente apenas quando ele já está na UTI, tomado por uma enfermidade letal, apresentando um quadro agudo. Nessa hora, parte-se para medidas extremas, de desespero, mobilizando-se o canivete e o açougueiro, sem anestesia e assepsia. Nessa hora, o cardiologista abre o tórax do moribundo na maca, no corredor. Não há como construir um novo hospital, decente, eficiente, nem para formar especialistas, nem para prevenir epidemias, nem para adotar procedimentos que evitem o agravamento da patologia. Por isso, o primeiro passo para evitar que a situação se repita é trocar a pergunta. O foco capaz de ajudar a mudar a realidade é aquele apontado por outra pergunta: o que fazer para aperfeiçoar a segurança pública, no Rio e no Brasil, evitando a violência de todos os dias, assim como sua intensificação, expressa nas sucessivas crises?

Se o entrevistador imaginário interpelar o respondente, afirmando que a sociedade exige uma resposta imediata, precisa de uma ação emergencial e não aceita nenhuma abordagem que não produza efeitos práticos imediatos, a melhor resposta seria: caro amigo, sua atitude representa, exatamente, a postura que tem impedido avanços consistentes na segurança pública. Se a sociedade, a mídia e os governos continuarem se recusando a pensar e abordar o problema em profundidade e extensão, como um fenômeno multidimensional a requerer enfrentamento sistêmico, ou seja, se prosseguirmos nos recusando, enquanto Nação, a tratar do problema na perspectiva do médio e do longo prazos, nos condenaremos às crises, cada vez mais dramáticas, para as quais não há soluções mágicas.

A melhor resposta à emergência é começar a se movimentar na direção da reconstrução das condições geradoras da situação emergencial. Quanto ao imediato, não há espaço para nada senão o disponível, acessível, conhecido, que se aplica com maior ou menor destreza, reduzindo-se danos e prolongando-se a vida em risco.
A pergunta é obtusa e obscurantista, cúmplice da ignorância e da apatia.

(b) O que as polícias fluminenses deveriam fazer para vencer, definitivamente, o tráfico de drogas?

Em primeiro lugar, deveriam parar de traficar e de associar-se aos traficantes, nos “arregos” celebrados por suas bandas podres, à luz do dia, diante de todos. Deveriam parar de negociar armas com traficantes, o que as bandas podres fazem, sistematicamente. Deveriam também parar de reproduzir o pior do tráfico, dominando, sob a forma de máfias ou milícias, territórios e populações pela força das armas, visando rendimentos criminosos obtidos por meios cruéis.

Ou seja, a polaridade referida na pergunta (polícias versus tráfico) esconde o verdadeiro problema: não existe a polaridade. Construí-la –isto é, separar bandido e polícia; distinguir crime e polícia-- teria de ser a meta mais importante e urgente de qualquer política de segurança digna desse nome. Não há nenhuma modalidade importante de ação criminal no Rio de que segmentos policiais corruptos estejam ausentes. E só por isso que ainda existe tráfico armado, assim como as milícias.

Não digo isso para ofender os policiais ou as instituições. Não generalizo. Pelo contrário, sei que há dezenas de milhares de policiais honrados e honestos, que arriscam, estóica e heroicamente, suas vidas por salários indignos. Considero-os as primeiras vítimas da degradação institucional em curso, porque os envergonha, os humilha, os ameaça e acua o convívio inevitável com milhares de colegas corrompidos, envolvidos na criminalidade, sócios ou mesmo empreendedores do crime.

Não nos iludamos: o tráfico, no modelo que se firmou no Rio, é uma realidade em franco declínio e tende a se eclipsar, derrotado por sua irracionalidade econômica e sua incompatibilidade com as dinâmicas políticas e sociais predominantes, em nosso horizonte histórico. Incapaz, inclusive, de competir com as milícias, cuja competência está na disposição de não se prender, exclusivamente, a um único nicho de mercado, comercializando apenas drogas –mas as incluindo em sua carteira de negócios, quando conveniente. O modelo do tráfico armado, sustentado em domínio territorial, é atrasado, pesado, anti-econômico: custa muito caro manter um exército, recrutar neófitos, armá-los (nada disso é necessário às milícias, posto que seus membros são policiais), mantê-los unidos e disciplinados, enfrentando revezes de todo tipo e ataques por todos os lados, vendo-se forçados a dividir ganhos com a banda podre da polícia (que atua nas milícias) e, eventualmente, com os líderes e aliados da facção. É excessivamente custoso impor-se sobre um território e uma população, sobretudo na medida que os jovens mais vulneráveis ao recrutamento comecem a vislumbrar e encontrar alternativas. Não só o velho modelo é caro, como pode ser substituído com vantagens por outro muito mais rentável e menos arriscado, adotado nos países democráticos mais avançados: a venda por delivery ou em dinâmica varejista nômade, clandestina, discreta, desarmada e pacífica. Em outras palavras, é melhor, mais fácil e lucrativo praticar o negócio das drogas ilícitas como se fosse contrabando ou pirataria do que fazer a guerra. Convenhamos, também é muito menos danoso para a sociedade, por óbvio.

(c) O Exército deveria participar?

Fazendo o trabalho policial, não, pois não existe para isso, não é treinado para isso, nem está equipado para isso. Mas deve, sim, participar. A começar cumprindo sua função de controlar os fluxos das armas no país. Isso resolveria o maior dos problemas: as armas ilegais passando, tranquilamente, de mão em mão, com as benções, a mediação e o estímulo da banda podre das polícias.

E não só o Exército. Também a Marinha, formando uma Guarda Costeira com foco no controle de armas transportadas como cargas clandestinas ou despejadas na baía e nos portos. Assim como a Aeronáutica, identificando e destruindo pistas de pouso clandestinas, controlando o espaço aéreo e apoiando a PF na fiscalização das cargas nos aeroportos.

(d) A imagem internacional do Rio foi maculada?

Claro. Mais uma vez.

(e) Conseguiremos realizar com êxito a Copa e as Olimpíadas?

Sem dúvida. Somos ótimos em eventos. Nesses momentos, aparece dinheiro, surge o “espírito cooperativo”, ações racionais e planejadas impõem-se. Nosso calcanhar de Aquiles é a rotina. Copa e Olimpíadas serão um sucesso. O problema é o dia a dia.

Press release and call for action on June 26 from ENCOD

No Brasil a Psicotropicus promove evento cultural para marcar o dia 26, compareça!

As they do every year just before the 26 of June (World day against drugs), UNODC released yesterday the 2010 World drug report. Below is just UNODC's press release, but it highlights the main points of the report. As we all know this report is based in rather controversial collection of data from member states, so we should be aware of the always biased content of the report. But, anyway, it is an important tool to see trends in UNODC position and line of campaigning. I highlighted (in red) some statements I found important and I also made some comments (in blue CAPS).

Press release UNODC World Drug Report 2010

Shows Shift Towards New Drugs and New Markets

VIENNA, 23 June (UN Information Service) - The World Drug Report 2010, issued today at the National Press Club in Washington by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), shows that drug use is shifting towards new drugs and new markets. Drug cultivation is declining in Afghanistan (for opium) and the Andean countries (coca), and drug use has stabilized in the developed world. However, there are signs of an increase in drug use in developing countries, and growing abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and prescription drugs around the world.

Cultivation of opium and cocaine down

The Report shows that the world's supply of the two main problem drugs - opiates and cocaine - keeps declining. The global area under opium cultivation has dropped by almost a quarter (23 per cent) in the past two years, and opium production looks set to fall steeply in 2010 due to a blight that could wipe out a quarter of Afghanistan's poppy crop. Coca cultivation, down by 28 per cent in the past decade, has kept declining in 2009. World cocaine production has declined by 12-18 per cent over the 2007-2009 period.

Heroin: production declining, interdictions low

Global potential heroin production fell by 13 per cent to 657 tons in 2009, reflecting lower opium production in both Afghanistan and Myanmar. The actual amount of heroin reaching the market is much lower (around 430 tons) since significant amounts of opium are being stockpiled. UNODC estimates that there are currently more than 12,000 tons of Afghan opium or, around two and a half years of global illicit opiate demand, being stock-piled.

The global heroin market, estimated at US$55 billion, is concentrated in Afghanistan (which accounts for 90 per cent of supply), Russia, Iran and Western Europe which together consume half the heroin produced in the world.

Although Afghanistan produces most of the world's opiates, it seizes less than two per cent of them. Iran and Turkey are scoring the highest, responsible for over half of all heroin seized globally in 2008. Interdiction rates elsewhere are much lower. Along the northern route, the countries of Central Asia are only seizing a meagre five per cent of the 90 tons of heroin that cross their territory heading towards Russia. In turn Russia, that consumes 20 per cent of the Afghan heroin output, seizes only four per cent of this flow. The figures are even worse along the Balkan route: some countries of South-Eastern Europe, including EU member states, are intercepting less than two per cent of the heroin crossing their territory.

Cocaine market is shifting

The World Drug Report 2010 shows that cocaine consumption has fallen significantly in the United States in the past few years. The retail value of the US cocaine market has declined by about two thirds in the 1990s, and by about one quarter in the past decade. "One reason for the drug-related violence in Mexico is that cartels are fighting over a shrinking market," said UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa. "This in-fight is a blessing for America, as the resulting cocaine drought is causing lower addiction rates, higher prices and lesser purity of doses."

To an extent the problem has moved across the Atlantic: in the last decade the number of cocaine users in Europe doubled, from 2 million in 1998 to 4.1 million in 2008. By 2008, the European market (US$34 billion) was almost as valuable as the North American market (US$37 billion). The shift in demand has led to a shift in trafficking routes, with an increasing amount of cocaine flowing to Europe from the Andean countries via West Africa. This is causing regional instability. "People snorting coke in Europe are killing the pristine forests of the Andean countries and corrupting governments in West Africa," said Mr. Costa.

Use of synthetic drugs exceeds opiates and cocaine combined

The global number of people using amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) - estimated at around 30-40 million - is soon likely to exceed the number of opiate and cocaine users combined. There is also evidence of increasing abuse of prescription drugs. "We will not solve the world drugs problem if we simply push addiction from cocaine and heroin to other addictive substances - and there are unlimited amounts of them, produced in mafia labs at trivial costs," warned Mr. Costa.

The ATS market is harder to track because of short trafficking routes (manufacturing usually takes place close to main consumer markets), and the fact that many of the raw materials are both legal and readily available. Manufacturers are quick to market new products (like ketamine, piperazines, Mephedrone and Spice) and exploit new markets. "These new drugs cause a double problem. First, they are being developed at a much faster rate than regulatory norms and law enforcement can keep up. Second, their marketing is cunningly clever, as they are custom-manufactured so as to meet the specific preference in each situation," said Mr. Costa.

The number of ATS-related clandestine laboratories reported increased by 20 per cent in 2008, including in countries where such labs had never been detected in the past.

Manufacture of 'ecstasy' has increased in North America (notably in Canada) and in several parts of Asia, and use seems to be increasing in Asia. In another demonstration of the fluidity of drug markets, ecstasy use in Europe has plummeted since 2006.

(ANOTHER GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE FAILURE OF THE ACTUAL GLOBAL CONTROL SYSTEM BASED ON CROP ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION IN BORDERS AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES)

Cannabis still the world's drug of choice

Cannabis remains the world's most widely produced and used illicit substance: it is grown in almost all countries of the world, and is smoked by 130-190 million people at least once a year - though these parameters are not very telling in terms of addiction. The fact that cannabis use is declining in some of its highest value markets, namely North America and parts of Europe, is another indication of shifting patterns of drug abuse.

UNODC found evidence of indoor cultivation of cannabis for commercial purposes in 29 countries, particularly in Europe, Australia and North America. Indoor growing is a lucrative business and is increasingly a source of profit for criminal groups. Based on evidence gathered in 2009, Afghanistan is now the world's leading producer of cannabis resin (as well as opium).

Insufficient drug treatment

The World Drug Report 2010 exposes a serious lack of drug treatment facilities around the world. "While rich people in rich countries can afford treatment, poor people and/or poor countries are facing the greatest health consequences," warned the head of UNODC. The Report estimates that, in 2008, only around a fifth of problem drug users worldwide had received treatment in the past year, which means around 20 million drug dependent people did not receive treatment. "It is time for universal access to drug treatment," said Mr. Costa.

He called for health to be the centrepiece of drug control. "Drug addiction is a treatable health condition, not a life sentence. Drug addicts should be sent to treatment, not to jail. And drug treatment should be part of mainstream healthcare."

(OK, WE AGREE, BUT SPENDING SO MUCH MONEY ON DRUG INTERDICTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS AND DRUG WAR FAIRS (ALL SUPPORTED AND STIMULATED BY UNODC), HOW EXACTLY COUNTRIES WILL BE ABLE TO INVEST MORE ON DRUG TREATMENT, PREVENTION AND HARM REDUCTION?)

He also called for greater respect for human rights. "Just because people take drugs, or are behind bars, this doesn't abolish their rights. I appeal to countries where people are executed for drug-related offences or, worse, are gunned down by extra-judicial hit squads, to end this practice."

(HE FAILS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WAS THIS CLIMATE OF DRUG WAR PROMOTED BY UNODC AND HIS STRONGEST ALLIES - LIKE USA- THAT VERY LIKELY ENCOURAGED THOSE COUNTRIES TO EXTEND THIS KIND OF PENALTIES TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND USERS).

Warning signs in the developing world

Mr. Costa highlighted the dangers of drug use in the developing world. "Market forces have already shaped the asymmetric dimensions of the drug economy; the world's biggest consumers of the poison (the rich countries) have imposed upon the poor (the main locations of supply and trafficking) the greatest damage," said Mr. Costa. "Poor countries are not in a position to absorb the consequences of increased drug use. The developing world faces a looming crisis that would enslave millions to the misery of drug dependence."

He cited the boom in heroin consumption in Eastern Africa, the rise of cocaine use in West Africa and South America, and the surge in the production and abuse of synthetic drugs in the Middle East and South East Asia. "We will not solve the world drugs problem by shifting consumption from the developed to the developing world," said Mr. Costa.

Drug trafficking and instability

The World Drug Report 2010 contains a chapter on the destabilizing influence of drug trafficking on transit countries, focusing in particular on the case of cocaine. It shows how under-development and weak governance attract crime, while crime deepens instability. It shows how the wealth, violence and power of drug trafficking can undermine the security, even the sovereignty, of states. The threat to security posed by drug trafficking has been on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council several times during the past year.

While drug-related violence in Mexico receives considerable attention, the Northern Triangle of Central America, consisting of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador is even more badly affected, with murder rates much higher than in Mexico. The Report says that Venezuela has emerged as a major departure point for cocaine trafficked to Europe: between 2006 and 2008, over half of all detected maritime shipments of cocaine to Europe came from Venezuela.

The Report highlights the unstable situation in West Africa which has become a hub for cocaine trafficking. It notes that "traffickers have been able to co-opt top figures in some authoritarian societies", citing the recent case of Guinea-Bissau.

Mr. Costa called for more development to reduce vulnerability to crime, and increased law enforcement cooperation to deal with drug trafficking. "Unless we deal effectively with the threat posed by organized crime, our societies will be held hostage - and drug control will be jeopardized, by renewed calls to dump the UN drug conventions that critics say are the cause of crime and instability. This would undo the progress that has been made in drug control over the past decade, and unleash a public health disaster," he warned. "Yet, unless drug prevention and treatment are taken more seriously, public opinion's support to the UN drug conventions will wane."

(IN THE LATEST ENCOD BULLETIN I RAISED SOME ARGUMENTS TO SHOW THAT THE ACTUAL SYSTEM IS THE MAJOR RESPONSIBLE FOR UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DRUG HEALTH PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE HAVE TO CONTINUE RAISING PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE (OR "UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES") OF THE CURRENT "DRUG CONTROL" SYSTEM AND SHOW ALTERNATIVES THAT COULD IMPROVE HEALTH AND DIMINISH DRUG TRAFFICKING RELATED VIOLENCE).

LET'S SPREAD THE HYPOCRISY OF THE UNODC STRATEGY, THAT IS IN ONE HAND PROMOTING INCREASE ON DRUG WAR EXPENSES AND ON THE OTHER IS CALLING FOR A HEALTHIER APPROACH. IN MY VIEW THOSE TWO CANNOT FAIRLY COEXIST. FOR A TRULY HEALTHIER APPROACH A NEW DRUG REGULATION SYSTEM HAS TO BE PUT IN PLACE, RESPECTING DRUG USERS NEEDS AND RIGHTS, AND FINDING SOLUTIONS - NOT ONLY JAIL OR DEATH - TO PEOPLE INVOLVED WITH PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING.)TR

By Ángel Páez

LIMA, Feb 2008 (IPS) - Anti-drug police at Peru’s "Jorge Chávez" international airport in Lima have had their hands full over the last year, arresting nearly two "mules" a day, each carrying an average of five kg of pure cocaine.
In 2005, 249 "mules" or drug couriers were arrested. In 2006 there were 454 arrests, and last year the number rose to 721, carrying a total of nearly four tons of cocaine, the police National Anti-Drug Directorate told IPS.

The usual method is to swallow some 10 packets or capsules, each containing 100 grams of cocaine. But often larger quantities are carried, with the drug hidden under false bottoms in luggage, camouflaged in different kinds of containers, or attached to the body with adhesive tape.

Of the 721 smugglers arrested in 2007, 62.4 percent (453) were Peruvian and the rest were foreigners, particularly from Spain (45), the Netherlands (29) and Brazil (18). Over three-quarters of the Peruvian "mules" were poor or unemployed.

According to the histories of detainees taken by the anti-drug police at the airport, the going rate paid by drug traffickers to couriers who swallow cocaine packets and are sent to Brazil or Argentina is about 1,000 dollars.

If they are sent to the United States, Europe or Asia, where the drugs have higher value, payment can be between 2,000 and 3,000 dollars. The more the couriers travel, the more they are paid, unless they are caught by the police, or die from cocaine poisoning when a capsule splits open in their bowels.

For a poor or unemployed Peruvian, the payment for swallowing the capsules and travelling four or five hours to Buenos Aires or Sao Paulo is extremely attractive, in spite of the risks.

The number of people willing to take the risk is increasing. In 2007, 452 were arrested, compared to 193 in 2006.

Poverty creates a fertile recruiting ground.

The Peruvian press, accustomed to printing news about "mule" detentions, was nevertheless shocked on Dec. 22 by the arrest of 43-year-old Evelyn Changra, who attempted to travel to Buenos Aires with one kg of cocaine in her stomach, together with her children, aged 17 and 15, who had also swallowed drugs.

"This was a very poor family from San Juan de Lurigancho," an anti-drug police officer told IPS, referring to one of the most densely populated shantytown districts of Lima.

"The drug trafficker who recruited Evelyn Changra promised her 3,000 dollars if she would take her children along. She accepted because she had never been offered so much money in her life," the source said.

A large proportion of Peruvian "mules" also come from Villa El Salvador, Comas and Carabayllo, similar working-class districts on the outskirts of Lima.

Of the 721 couriers intercepted at the airport, 303 (42 percent) were heading for Brazil, 148 (20.5 percent) for Argentina and 122 (16.9 percent) for Spain. Recently introduced cut-price commercial flights from Lima to Sao Paulo have encouraged the drug mafias to increase trafficking to Brazil’s biggest city.

In Argentina, drug traffickers are active among the large Peruvian community in Buenos Aires, and through relatives, they recruit "mules" from poor districts like San Juan de Lurigancho. In fact, the most important drug lords operating in the Argentine capital come from that part of Lima.

"Those we catch tend to be people who stand out because they are obviously nervous, behave suspiciously, or don’t look as if they could afford a plane ticket. But many do manage to leave the country," the police source said. "It’s impossible to take X-rays of everybody, and it’s also impossible to search all the baggage and every object that could potentially be hiding cocaine."

As trafficking by "mule" increases, President Alan García announced that he would hold talks with the governments of several countries so that their citizens would serve sentences in their home countries, to ease the overcrowding in Peruvian prisons. The National Prisons Institute told IPS that only 18 percent of the drug couriers arrested have so far been sentenced.

In the Santa Monica women’s prison in Lima, there are 1,275 inmates accused of drug-related crimes: 942 Peruvians and 207 foreigners. Less than 240 have already been convicted and sentenced.

"Mules" who are willing to cooperate with the justice system can reduce their sentences by up to seven years. But if they refuse to cooperate, they risk being accused of belonging to an international drug trafficking organisation, a crime that carries a penalty of up to 15 years in prison.

"There’s been a real wave of arrests, and all the indications are that 2008 will be another record year. Now the drug barons are recruiting people from the valleys where cocaine is refined and produced. Using ‘mules’ is a cheap method for them, because losing half a ton or one ton of cocaine in a big shipment is worse than losing one kilo when a ‘mule’ is caught," said the officer.

The main cocaine production centres are in the Huallaga valley, in the country’s Amazon jungle region, and in the basins of the Apurimac and Ene rivers, in the southeastern part of the highlands region. Poverty is extreme in both places. In some areas up to 70 percent of the population is poor.

According to a 2007 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), cocaine production in Peru has been rising over the last five years.

In 2001, the estimated production of cocaine hydrochloride was 150 tons, compared to 280 tons in 2006.

However, according to the Peruvian police force’s own statistics, drug seizures fell last year. In 2006, 14.6 tons of cocaine were confiscated, and in 2007, just over eight tons. Good news for the traffickers. (END/2008)

By Lauren Fulton
Courting Africa, Vol. 29 (2) - Summer 2007 Issue

Lauren Fulton is a staff writer at the Harvard International Review

With the reelection of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in September 2006, inequities appeared to be fading and the quality of life of the average Brazilian seemed to be improving. Lula promised to advance the economy, already the ninth largest in the world, and thereby strengthen Brazil’s claim to be a “country of the future” and an economic world power. In order to achieve this, Lula recognized the necessity of combating poverty and to this end, he set up the Bolsa family grant, which delivers aid to the most impoverished regions of Brazil. Many Brazilians assumed that drug trafficking, which had been increasing since the 1980s, would subsequently decrease alongside falling poverty. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. A 25-year legacy of drug trafficking has made the practice a major feature of Brazil’s perpetually impoverished urban slums. While the country is currently on track to see a 50 percent reduction of poverty by 2015, drug production has only escalated. Hence, Lula’s main initiative should be to overcome organized crime in the slums, such that the poor, who remain vulnerable to gang warfare, will be able to live free of crime and rise out of poverty.

In a 2001 report released by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Committee, large scale cultivation of coca—whose leaves are the major raw material for cocaine—was noted to be spreading from Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, where it has long been documented, to Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Governments are concerned that its spread may correlate with the steady rise in drug trafficking in South American countries, most notably Brazil. While Brazilian drug trafficking began in the 1980s with the exposure of gold miners to the lucrative dealing of drugs in the border states, cocaine production and trafficking has taken root in urban slums, where gangs began earning a quick profit for exporting the contraband. In March 1999, then-Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso created a task force designed to fight drug trafficking and organized crime, thereby acknowledging the connection between crime mobs, drug trafficking, and poverty.

Unfortunately, the causal links among poverty, crime, and drug trafficking have been embedded in the nation. Poverty has created a culture of drug trafficking that will need continued effort and money to prevent further proliferation. The urban slums, especially those in Sao Paulo, have spawned organized gangs that deal in cocaine and raw drug products, and the violence that results from the combination deters police from entering the areas. The shantytowns, or favelas, are breeding grounds for new militias that continuously come into existence once an old gang is defeated. In February 2007, it was reported that these militia had overrun 90 of Brazil’s 600 favelas, often taking control of the drug trade themselves. What is most troubling is that the militias have included former police officers, prison guards, and firefighters who have turned to a more profitable reign of terror over slums and drug lords, further entrenching a deeply ingrained culture of corruption. Lula’s grants and attempts to end poverty have not reached these slums, and unless they are cleared of crime and reconstructed without the organized gangs, poverty and drugs will persist. Brazil needs to firmly prove that organized crime will not be tolerated and that officials even in impoverished areas will receive a fair salary. In order to do this, the income inequality gap must be bridged.

Only several years ago, Brazil had the most unequal income distribution in the world. With the Gini coefficient—which measures income equality from 0, for perfect distribution, to 1, for completely inequitable distribution—hovering around 0.6 between 1976 and 1996, Brazil’s growth has not benefited everyone; other countries with similar growth rates maintain Gini coefficients of approximately 0.34. At present, the richest 20 percent of the population receive 30 times more income than the poorest. This disparity helps create the slums that become home to organized gangs and drug lords. Furthermore, many of the gains made under Cardoso and Lula measure success on a countrywide scale and ignore the fact that while some of the impoverished have increased their incomes, those in Sao Paulo’s slums have not.

The question remains, what can Brazil do about this growing socioeconomic threat? Lula’s main objective should be to stop preserving a faзade of equal national prosperity and instead focus on solving the real problems of the urban poor. Although poverty is decreasing in Brazil, Lula must now deal with its consequences; drug trafficking in Brazil can only be eradicated by continuing to fight organized crime and close the income inequality gap.

This is another interesting text, produced by the NGO Breaking the Chains, exploring the implication of the war on drugs to Latin American countries. It calls attention to increased interdiction efforts leading to increased smuggling of more potent drugs (highlighted in blue). Which is another important source of health related problems that could be most linked with criminalization policies.

The original text can be downloaded form Drug Policy Alliance website.


How is Latin America affected by the U.S. war on drugs?